.B 41 
.W34 
-opy 1 



^lETHOD OF EDUCATION: 



A.N A^DDKESS 



INTRODUCTORY TO THE SESSION 1859-6U 



OF THE 



ST. LOUIS MEDICAL COLLEGE, 



J. H. WATTE RS, M.D., 

Professor of Physiology and Medical Jurisprudenca. 



-^ST, LOUIS: 
GEORGE KNAPP & CO., PRINTERS. 
1859. 



^■UK£^ 



/ 



METHOD OF EDUCATION 



A.:^ AI3X)I^ESS 



INTRODUCTORY TO THE SESSION 1859-60 



ST. LOUIS MEDICAL COLLEGE, 



J. H. WAITERS, M.D., 

Professor of Pliysiology and Medical Jurisprudence. 



-r^v'^soAv;^ , 



S ST. LOUIS: 
GEORGE KNAPP & CO., PRINTERS. 
18 5 9. 



St. Louis Medical College, 

November 1st, 1859. 

Prof. J. H. Watters. 

\ 
Dear Sir, 

At a meeting held by tlie Class, J. T. Marsh in the 
chair, it was unanimously resolved, tliat a committee be appointed for the pur- 
pose of requesting from you permission to publish your Introductory Address, 
delivered before the Class, in College Hall, on the evening of October 31st. 
Hoping that the above resolve may receive your approbation, a favorable reply 
will meet with the thanks of the Class, and of yours, 

KespectfuUy, 

J. L. WILCOX. 
GBATZ A. ]V10.-E>-, 
CHA?\ KXOWER. 
JO[IN THOMPSON 
J. C. IIICKERSON 



St. Louis, Nov. 2, 1859. 

Dear Sirs, 

The manuscript of my lecture is at your service ; please jiresent 
to the Class my acknowledgment of the compliment, 

And believe me, as ever, 
Your attaclied friend, 

J. H. WATTEKS, 
To Messrs Wilcox, Moses, Knower, Thompson, nicker.»-()n. 



METHOD OF EDUCATION: 



An Address Introductory to the Session 1859-60 of the St. Louis Medical 
College. By J. H. WATTERS, M.D„ Professor of Physiology and Med- 
ical Jurisprudence. 



Gentlemen, — Under favorable auspices we meet to-night to 
celebrate the 02:)ening of our eighteenth session, and in behalf of 
the faculty I welaome you as stiidents to these halls dedicated to 
medical education. 

The ardent aspirations of the young of a country to fit them- 
selves for useful and honorable activities, brings hapjiiness not 
only to the individual, but secures life, intelligence and refine- 
ment to society — stability, power and influence to the state. It is 
this Avhich engenders and fosters the very vitality, spirit and soul 
of a community. General society — yes, our whole country — is 
interested in this assemblage of young men gathered hither from 
the various parts of our extensive and prosperous valley, all in- 
spired with a common desire to be enabled to render a reasonable 
answer to the problem of life. Some answer, whether it be rea- 
sonable or not, must be given by every man. It is not optional, 
but the necessity is implied in the very existence of a rational be- 
ing : it is not a request, but an imperative demand. Should one 
think to avoid it by silence or refusal to act, he deceives himself; 
for his very silence and supineness become contempt, and contain 
already his answer. 

Man is by nature most munificently gifted; but his character and 
activities are the answer he renders to the question, " what will he 
do with it" — with his life, his mind, his reason, his image of God ? 
The various grades of characters, from the lowest besotted di-egs 
of society to the highest and noblest men, present merely the dif- 
ferent uses made of nature's high gifts. Consider now 

"The wisest of the sages of the earth 
That ever from the stores of reason drew 
Science, and truth, and virtue's dreadless tone ;" 



and now reflect upon tliis solemn fact, tliat 

" Ilini, every slave now (Iratjging through tlie filth 
Of some corrupted city his sad life, 
Pining with famine, swoln with luxury, 
Blunting the keenness of his spiritual sense 
With narrow schemings and unworthy cares, 
Or, madly rushing through all violent crime. 
To move the deep stagnation of liis soul, — 
Might imitate and equal." 

We liear in our youth too niucli cant about "poor weak liuniau 
nature, the flesh, and the devil ;" and those Avho Avould throw 
upon the shoulders of these imaginary personalities the necessary 
and legitimate results of individtial slothfulness, inactivity, and re- 
fusal to use Avhat has been given, would obliterate what little of 
the image of God is yet A'isible in humanity, and would juit a stop 
to progress — not by bold and open opposition, which would be ac- 
companied Math corresponding reaction, but by smothering and 
destroying the already enfeebled energy and s})irit. 

That each individual may use his talents and powers in the best 
and most reasonable way possible, is the object of all education, 
Avhether literary, professional, scientiflc, or religious. In other 
words, the object of education is to enable man, in his activities, 
to harmonize with the Infinite, the Universal, the Absolute. It is 
only as his activities do harmonize and thtis cooperate with the 
Infinite, that man is emancipated and exalted ; while in so far as 
they are discordant, man militates against God, and in the con- 
flict is always vanquished, degraded and enslaved. Tliis proposi- 
tion is universal, and extends in its application through the whole 
range of human activities. And, gentlemen, as you propose to as- 
sume the responsible vocation of physicians, the object of your 
professional studies is that you may be enabled so to act upon 
physical nature as to cure disease and relieve sxtffering. This, 
too, can be done only by cooperating with the imivcrsal and abso- 
lute in perfect obedience to the physical laws; which laws are to 
us the outward expression or representation, in space and time, of 
universal reason. If our acts are not in obedience to these laws, 
our medications, like the prayers of the wicked, are an abomina- 
tion. It is a common saying that nature cures disease, and that 
the physician's province is to assist nature. While this expression 
admits of very liberal interpretations, yet literally it is most false. 
Man under no circumstances assists nature ; this is neither his 
province nor prerogative : it is his highest privilege to use nature. 
But how are we to use nature ? By what method are we enabled 



to take advantage of her laws ? In other words, what relation has 
education to success, science to art? This is the question I pro- 
pose discussing to-night; and while I address you, gentlemen, 
especially, as medical students, the method by which you will be 
enabled to attain the objects of your calling, is the method of 
every human activity whatever — of your social and political rela- 
tions no less than professional. 

As the object of all education is to enable man to harmonize his 
activities with the Infinite, the Universal, the Absolute, this object 
can be attained only so far as we know the Infinite, the Universal, 
the Absolute. I am aware that there are those high in authority 
who contend that the capacity for this knowledge is not vouch- 
safed to man. If this be so, then indeed are we most miserably 
circumstanced. What! here — possessing hopes, desires, aspira- 
tions, longings for something better — condemned to disappoint- 
ment and ignoble defeat upon every side, except in so far as our 
activities are in harmony with the Infinite, and yet having no ca- 
pacity to know that Infinite by whom we are judged and to Avhom 
we are subject! This cannot be so: else man could not adapt 
means to ends ; the result of his spontaneity would be altogether 
accidental ; his fortune would not be in his own hands. It is not so : 
the development of science condemns it; our railroads, telegraphs, 
and manufactures, and all the arts, condemn it; our social, politi- 
cal and religious relations condemn it ; all culture and progress 
condemn it. As the result of every human activity is determined 
by its relation to the Infinite, the relation which any people bear 
to the Infinite is expressed not only in their moral, social, political 
and religious condition, but also as well in their machinery, their 
manufiictures, their agriculture, their navigation, their architecture, 
their painting, their sculpture, their poetry, their ornaments, their 
dress, in all their activities and in every expression of their sponta- 
neity. All advancement and progress of the individual, of society, 
of humanity, is proof that we have the faculty to know the Absx)- 
lute to which we are subject, as all success is but an expression of 
this knowledge, and a resulting harmony between our activities 
and the Infinite. 

But man is guided in his activities by his intelligence, and mind 
is in its very nature active, spontaneous, self-determinate. Know- 
ledge, therefore, must be the determination of the mind itself, else 
the spontaneity and self-determination of mind would be super- 
seded and abrogated by knowledge, which is absurd. Consequent- 
ly, the mind must possess the faculty of determining itself harmo- 
niously with the Universal and Absolute ; — ^whether you agree to 



designate this power of tlie mind thus to determine itself, as know- 
ledge of the Universal and Absolute, or not, matters nothing, so far 
as the question under discussion is concerned — By what method 
is man enabled to harmonize his activities with the Infinite, the 
Universal, the Absolute f This faculty is reason, lieason being 
one and absolute to man, to nature, and to God, it is most appa- 
rent, that, so far as our activities harmonize with I'eason, they must 
in that very fact harmonize with the Universe and with God. 
Therefore, the method by Avhich the object of all education is to 
be attained, is the method by Avhich we are enabled to harmonize 
our activities with JReason. This proposition, gentlemen, embod- 
ies the central idea which I hope to present to you to-night in an 
intelligible manner. You will observe the important pjoint, that 
in this proposition we have substituted lleasoii for the Infi- 
nite, the Universal, the Absolute. I know full well, that, in 
making this substitution here in a public lecture, I am in no little 
danger of being understood as making man equal with God. But 
if there were no danger here, there would be little or no occasion 
for this lecture ; and if, on account of this danger, I had chosen 
another theme, or had treated this in a manner to conform to the 
more general and popular notions, I would in that have been hug- 
ging my t)wn shackles ; whereas my theme this night is, IIow are 
we freed, emancipated, exalted? A just man has not his freedom 
curtailed by just laws in so far as he cognizes justice, because the 
law unto himself frees him from the external laws ; that is, the ex- 
ternal laws cease to bind and restrain him just in so far as from his 
own self-determination he would fulfil them. Just so, and for the 
same reason, a reasonable man has not his freedom annulled by 
the laws of reason in so far as he knows reason. As one in his own 
spontaneity determines himself according to reason, he ceases to 
be restrained by the external laws of reason. If all moral and 
physical laws be laws of reason, then indeed can man be delivered 
from the dominion of necessity only so fiir as reason in him be- 
comes self-conscious. We believe in Divine Omnipotence ; that 
in the Infinite "we live, and move, and have our being;" that with- 
0l^t Ilim we can not think a good thought or do a good act ; and 
yet we believe that man is free and justly accountable. The truth 
and consistency of these two positions is all I contend for in the 
substitution I have made of Reason for the Infinite, the Absolute, 
the Universal. He who believes in human freedom can not but 
believe that man possesses the faculty of determining himself in 
harmony with the Universal ; for in so far as man is determined 
by anywhat not himself, he is necessitated and not free. He who 



believes in human freedom and also in Divine Omnipotence and 
Omniscience, must believe these two positions consistent ; unless, 
indeed, he be himself a slave, clinging in blind fanaticism to the 
very chains which bind him. And what does he mean by consist- 
ency except their mutual harmony with reason? And when he 
acknowledges that two truths viust be consistent, in this necessity 
he recognizes reason as the universal umpire, authoritative to man, 
to nature, and to God. 

If, therefore, the object of all education is to enable us to har- 
monize our activities with reason, then the method we seek is the 
method of reason becoming self-conscious, oi', in other words, it is 
the method of reason coming to a knowledge of itself. This is 
perfectly clear, that in order that we may harmonize our activities 
with reason we must know reason. But the reason alone can 
know reason; consequently we can know reason only as the reason 
becomes self-conscious. Did you ever see a little child held before 
a looking-glass ? Through its senses it cognizes the phenomenon 
and through its understanding it is convinced of duality, — it peeps 
behind the glass fully expecting to find another child. But as it 
comes to know itself^ with apparent rapture it recognizes itself 
in the image. Not the senses^ nor yet the iinderstanding, but only 
reason can know and comprehend reason. The spontaneity of man 
may be under the dominion of the senses, or of the understanding, 
or of the passions; but as these are all finite and related to the in- 
finite only in and through reason, when tliey guide, the blind lead 
the blind and both fall into tlie ditch together. But when our 
spontaneity is guided by reason, the outward expressions of this 
spontaneity — our activities, our works — must harmonize with rea- 
son, with nature, and with God. The great problem of humanity, 
therefore, is to identify our spontaneity in each, every and all of 
its vai-ious possibilities with self-conscious reason. Our question, 
therefore, as to the method by which the object of education is to 
be attained is now reduced to this form : What is the method of 
the reason in becoming self-conscious ? 

As we are students of nature, and as in this department especial- 
ly Ave hope to assist in the great struggle of humanity, and to leave 
the world the better of our having lived, (if this be not our ambi- 
tion we are unworthy of humanity,) I shall seek this method only 
as expressed in the more developed sciences. And we may hope 
to get some insight thus, because Science is the formal recognition 
of reason. Do not allow yourselves to anticipate me here, and to 
object in your thoughts to this position, that the physical sciences 
treat of nature and her laws, and, consequently, that a knowledge 



10 

of these laws can bo obtained only through observation and ex- 
periment. Be patient one moment and we will consider this matter 
together. It is admitted that observation and experiment are ne- 
cessary conditions to a knowledge of nature and her huvs, but you 
must admit also that you neither see, feel, taste, nor smell the j^hysi- 
cal sciences. It is true you put ores and compounds into the 
crucible, but you neither put therein nor take hence the science of 
clieniistry ; it is true certain angles and distances must be obtained 
by observation, but the transit instrument and the telescope are not 
wonderfully devised machines for the manufacture of the science 
of astronomy; you may examine and pee]), but the science is not 
there — you can not get it thus. What, then, is the relation between 
observation and science? This question is si(l> Judice, and until 
decided it might be Avell to suspend our anticipated objection. 
Physical science is rendered possible only in and througli the 
identity of the laws of nature and the laws of thought. This is 
a self-evident proposition ; for if nature could in her mode of 
action be whimsical or unreasonable, where, I ask, would be the 
criterion whereby we could know natui-e or determine her mode 
of action ? There would be none, and we Avould necessarily be ut- 
terly in the dark. If there be physical science at all, therefore, the 
laws of nature must be identical with the laws of thought, and 
Science must be the recognized identity. The senses do not and 
can not give us science ; observation and experiment can only give 
phenomena. Physical science exists only so far as reason has come 
to a recognition of itself in the phenomenal. That is, so far as we 
have science reason must have become the criterion "whereby na- 
ture is recoo-nized as laws of thous-ht. But reason can become 
the criterion only in so far as it becomes self-conscious, or as it 
knows itself. Consequently, we may hope by an examination and 
careful analysis of the sciences, to learn something of the method 
whereby the object of all education is to be attained ; in other 
words, of the method of reason in becoming self-conscious or in 
recognizing itself Though Ave may thus only obtain a partial in- 
sight, yet even this is not to be altogether despised. 

As mathematics is more developed and moi'e generally under- 
stood than any other science, we will direct our attention to it 
especially. And let it be understood that our object here is not 
to reduce all science to what has been termed the mathematical 
method, but rather to seek in the mathematics the method of the 
reason in becoming self-conscious, as all science (mathematics, of 
course, included) has been shown to be the reason coming to know 
and recognize itself As my object, as a teacher, is always more to 



11 

excite thought than to amuse, — to draw out the mind rather than 
to instil dogmas, I hope you Avill excuse me for selecting for your 
consideration a subject requiring so much study. My excuse is 
that the jirinciples involved in this subject, though they may seem 
abstract, are most practical, forming as they do the very foundation 
of all knowledge and all success. 

Mathematics as a science starts with certain 2:)rimary proposi- 
tions, which are divided usually into two classes — Definitions and 
Axioms. But what moan these propositions? whence came they, 
and where is the authority for the use made of them in mathemat- 
ics? If we can obtain correct answers to these questions, we will 
have approached very near what we seek : but do not be uneasy, I do 
not intend to load you over the paths already avcII worn by the Sen- 
sationalists and Idealists. First let me call your attention to this most 
important consideration — Tliat there can he no existence, law, mode 
of action, or phenoinenon, xmtlioiit limitations.; for all these im- 
ply determinations, and there can be no determinations without lim- 
itations. This is self-evident and absolute ; think of it one moment. 
There can be no this and that without a difference, and there can be 
no difference without limitations. To vision, pure light would bo 
equivalent to pure darkness ; there can be no seeing without a 
mingling of the two — without shades or colors. Power is equiva- 
lent to no power without resistance ; you can not lift yourself by 
the hair; as Archimedes could not find a poii stb, or place to fix 
his machine, he could not move the earth. The equation sign 
stands forever between absolute motion and no motion ; the an- 
cients did not recognize the parallel lines, and they attached the 
predicate no motion to the earth. And our physical sciences (so 
called) now are mostly legerdemain to induce the student, by com- 
jjlicating the pi-ocess, to believe he has succeeded in lifting him- 
self; in lieu of the earth, physical science is placed on the back of 
a tortoise. As there could be nothing to know, therefore, without 
limitations, so there could be no knowing. As all things and phe- 
nomena depend upon the union of oppositos, as of motion and rest, 
of power and resistance, of light and darkness; so science is based 
upon the union of opposites necessarily. As what is to be known 
has its existence in this union, evidently the knowing must be bas- 
ed upon it. Now pure space, like pure light, is without limits, and 
consequently is without determination. There is no this, as deter- 
mined from that ; there is no here and no there ; no outside and 
no inside ; no circumference, and no centre. As, for vision pure 
light must be united with its opposite — darkness, so the science 
of geometry must be based upon the union of the pure idea space 



12 

and its opposite. Now, wliat stands opposed to space as darkness 
is o])])osed to light? You at once recognize it as the point. The 
point is not space, but it is related to space as its ojiposite, as its 
negation, as its limitation. We are now prepared to understand 
the meaning of the Definitions upon which geometry is based. 
These definitions are the limitations of space by its opposite — the 
point ; — the motion of a point may be said to generate a line ; the 
motion of a line, to generate a surface; the motion of a surface, to 
generate a solid. So, while pure space is without limitations or 
determinations, yet united Avith its opposite we have definitions as 
the bases of science. We now have a here and a there, a this and 
a that. By this union we have a straight line, a curved line, a tri- 
angle, a square, a polygon, a circle, an ellipse, a parabola, an hy- 
perbola, a polyedron, a prism, a parallelopipedon, a sjihere, an ellip- 
soid, &c. &c. 

But before investigating further the meaning of the definitions 
of mathematics, we must investigate whence they came ; a know- 
ledge of their origin will contribute to the understanding of their 
nature. You are aware that many contend that all our knowledge, 
including of course mathematical definitions and axioms, is deri- 
ved from sensation ; and that others contend, no less confidently, 
for the existence of innate ideas, and for this origin of all know- 
ledge. It is not pertinent to our present object to meddle with 
either of these systems. We have seen that all determination is 
through limitation ; that is, if all limitation were removed from 
any thing, all determination would be removed ; and what would 
be left would be equivalent to nought — is nothing — the thing 
would no longer have existence. But do you say something would 
still be left ? Think one moment ; your something left being with- 
out determinations, wherein, I ask, is its difference from nothing ':* 
You call it something, I call it nothing, and you can not apply a 
predicate to your something which I can not also apply to my 
nothing; if you can, then your "something left" has limitations^ 
which is contrary to the hypothesis. It is j^erfectly apparent, 
therefore, if we know not the limitations, we know not the thing ; 
and that, in so far as we know the limitations, we know the thing 
in itself — the thing having an existence only in these limitations. 
Therefore, if things in themselves were not related to us, we could 
never know them ; if there were no bond of union between nature 
and ourselves, all things in nature by which we are surrounded 
would be to us as though they were not, — we would be uncon- 
scious of their existence. Consequently, if we know nature at all, 
(and no one will be likely to deny this,) there must be some means 



13 

of our knowing or becoming conscious of the limitations of things 
in themselves. But how can the mind know or become conscious 
of that which is outside of itself? This is the difficult but most 
important question. If we admit the duality of nature and mind, 
must Ave admit that the mind can get outside of itself to know na- 
ture ? This would be a manifest absurdity, for nothing can get 
outside of itself Then, to admit a knowledge of nature, are we 
compelled to do away with the duality, and to become out and out 
materialists on the one hand, or idealists on the other ? I think 
not. Then, if the mind can not get out of itself, how can the mind 
know nature if duality be admitted ? I think I see one, and only 
one possible solution of this problem ; for, in admitting that the 
mind can not get out of itself, we admit that our knowledge of na- 
ture comes from the mind knowing itself. This is the problem : 
Admitting the duality of nature and mind, and that the mind can 
not get out of itself, how can the mind know nature? 

It is admitted that Ave have some knoAvledge of nature, and, con- 
sequently, that there must be some relation betAveen mind and 
the external Avorld. Noav if we admit duality, the only possible 
relation is that of mutual limitation ; that is, in so far as nature and 
mind are distinct and dual, they must reciprocally exclude and ne- 
gate each other. And in so far as they are distinct, the only pos- 
sible relation they can have on the side of their duality must be 
the mutual limitation through this reciprocal exclusion and nega- 
tion. This is the only possible relation uj^on the admission of dual- 
ity, because neither could get outside of itself, Avhich Avould of 
course be necessary for any other relation. Consequently, this re- 
lation, so far from requiring the denial, is iti virtue of the duality ; 
and, as this is the only possible relation consistent with duality, this 
must be the avenue to a knoAvledge of nature ; or else, we must de- 
ny either the duality, or, the possibility of such knoAAdedge. These 
three are the only jiossible alternatives : — You must either do aAvay 
with the duality and become materialists on the one side, or ideal- 
ists on the other ; or else, admitting the duality, you must deny 
the possibility of a knoAvledge of nature ; or else, admitting both 
the duality and a joossibility of a knowledge of nature, you must 
find in the mutual exclusion and limitation the condition of this 
knowledge. Endorsing this last alternative, Ave must endeavor to see 
hoAV nature and mind mutually excluding and limiting each other, is 
the avenue to a knoAvledge of nature. "We are not now concerned 
with the inquiry koto nature and mind limit each other, but our 
present inquiry starts Avith the foct that they must limit each other, 
upon the admission of duality. This is the solution : Nature and 



14 

ntind mutually excluding; nnd limiting each other, in so far as the 
mind cognizes its ovxn limitation, in that act, being limited by na- 
tio'e, it recognizes the limitation of nature. To illustrate : suppose 
A and B own adjacent farms; A, in knowing the limitations of his, 
knows, in that very foot, the limitations of B's so far as they mutu- 
ally limit each other ; just so, the mind, in knowing its own limita- 
tions, knows the limitations of nature so for as they exclude and 
limit each other. Thus the mind knows nature in knowing itself. 
This is the only possible solution ; but we need no other as this is in 
every respect most satisfactory, containing within itself evidence 
of its truth, and is therefore worthy of all acceptation, even though 
we were not forced to adopt it, or else either materialism or ideal- 
ism, or the doctrine that all knowledge of nature is impossible. 
But, at first glance, all this may seem to have little to do with the 
Definitions of mathematics. Upon reflection, however, I suspect it 
will be found to have somewhat to do not only with mathematics 
but with our political, social and even religious condition, with the 
steam engine and weaver's shuttle and doctor's jjill, and even with 
our bread and butter. 

But to continue ; — all knowledge, therefore, including mathema- 
tics and the natural sciences, is the mind knowing itself. If this 
be so, you may ask, how do we know that nature is actual and 
real? You may say, "upon the admission of the duality of nature 
and mind, and, that they mutually limit each other, it is clear 
enough that the mind, in knowing itself, knows nature in so far as 
they thus limit each other; but, if the mind oidy knows itself, how 
do you get the duality ? IIow does the mind know that an actual 
nature stands over against it limiting it; and that these limitations 
of itself, which only it knows, have an external condition at all ?" 
This knowledge comes through sensation, which gives us a con- 
sciousness of objectivity. This Avill be clear, I think, if you will 
call to mind a point already discussed at some length. As Ave have 
seen that all existence and phenomena depend upon the union of 
opposites, as of motion and rest, of power and resistance, of light 
and darkness, so all consciousness implies duality. Consequently, 
consciousness in the line of our spontaneity — that is, a limitation 
Avhere we know there is no internal limitation — gives us objectiv- 
ity authoritatively. The primary condition of our knowledge of 
the existence of nature, as opposed to and as limiting mind, is mo- 
tion. But I must not dwell upon this part of my subject. 

On the other hand again, one disposed to sensationalism Avill ob- 
ject, — "this is all nonsense to talk about the mind knowing nature 
by knowing itself, — I see and feel objects themselves, but I do not 



15 

know the mind,— I can not see it !" I grant you your position fully— 
that you see and feel objects, and that you know mind very little; 
probably if you could only get it under a microscope, or into a cruci- 
ble, you w-ould know it better. But I thank you for your objection 
just here in close juxtaposition with the one of the idealist already 
considered; as we have to steer here between Scylla and Char}'bdis, 
we must keep in mind their localities. In reply to idealism just now, 
it was maintained that objectivity is given authoritatively in sensa- 
tion, in that all consciousness implies duality, — the union of op- 
posites. This seems to the senses to approach dangerously close 
to you, O voracious Charybdis ! who would draw all knowledge 
into the abyss of sensationalism. You say you do not know mind, 
but that you know nature, objects, matter, which are given in 
sensation. Hence you peep at nature; you make observations and 
experiments ; you turn her round to make her present herself to 
your senses on as many sides as possible ; probably you may use 
a microscope to assist the senses ; you note down very carefully 
the results — what you see!; you classify this and call it Physical 
Science! And to be so lucky as to see something first, say a new 
fossil, and to describe it and classify it, entitles one to endless fome 
in the history of Science! Can it be that now, in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, such a gross and bungling counterfeit is 
palmed upon humanity so currently ! You say you know little or 
nothing of mind because you can not see it, — this I have granted 
without the slightest mental reservation ; but you say you know 
nature and objects around you because you see them and feel 
them ! Hold ! you feel the fire and say it is hot ; you see the rose 
and say it is red ; you taste sugar and say it is sweet. But the 
sugar is not sweet, the rose is not red, the fire is not hot ; these are 
but sensations which you objectify and put into things which you 
say you know in sensation. Now you must acknowledge that you 
know not the things you imagine you see, and you say that you 
know not mind as yoii can not see it ; — what, then, do you know ? 
Your physical science is no science, containing as it does the two 
factors — the things seen and the individual seeing — most hetero- 
geneously mixed uj?, neither known, both undetermined, and one 
of them (the individual seeing) extremely variable. Call this 
Science! It is mockery, it is trifling with common sense to palm 
such stuff" oft' as science. 

We have seen that the mind can knoAV nature only in knowing 
itself, and, consequently, that the mind can know nature only in so 
far as they mutually limit each other. Now the grossest sensa- 
tionalist acts upon this position ; for when he says the rose is red, 



16 

that sugar is sweet, that fire is hot, lie actually makes his own 
limitations in sensation tlie limitations of things; and the more re- 
fined of the class who say, "we can know nothing of nature except 
the phenomena," in this fully endorse tlie same position. The real 
difterence between these and me is not here therefore, but ratlier 
in this, that they would restrict mind to sensation, or at most to 
the understanding. They, no less than I, acknowledge their own 
limitations as all they know of nature or indeed can knoAV. But 
it may be asked, — "if the limitations of mind are the means of our 
knowing things, or all of nature that we can know, are we not right 
in objectifying our sensations?" Certainly we are right; if we 
washed to, Ave could not help seeing tlie rose as red, feeling the fire 
as hot, and tasting sugar as sweet. But I do most solemnly pro- 
test against the currency of this, or of any classification or gen- 
eralization of AAdiat is given in sensation, as scie?ice either of na- 
ture or mind. Jt is not science, because the mind does not /cnoio 
and recognize itself in wJiat is given in sensation. It cognizes 
only the sensation, the feeling, the redness, the heat, the sweet- 
ness, &c., Avhich are cognized as Avell by beasts ; for no doubt 
they see the grass as green and feel the fire as hot as Avell as Ave. 
In the language of Scripture, — "The ox knoAveth his OAvner, and 
the ass his master's crib ; but Israel doth not knoAv, my people doth 
not consider." The mere cognition of phenomena is not knoAA"-- 
ledge either of the thing or of mind; and although plienomena are 
an essential condition of physical science, it is a gross blunder to 
suppose Ave can get knowledge or science by an accumulation, 
classification, and generalization of no-knoAvledge, wo-science. You 
can not hang your coat on the shadoAV of a nail ; it will not sustain 
it, try it as often as you please. From all Ave have said, it folloAvs 
most manifestly that, as the thing exists only in its limitations as 
we have seen, and as the limitations of nature are the limitations of 
reason, physical science can only exist in this, — the reason becoming 
self-conscious and recognizing itself in tohat is given in soisation. 
This is a most difficult process, but it alone is Avorthy of humanity 
and of our highest ambition ; the reason in becoming self-conscious 
pulls down the "Avall of partition," and admits us into the Aery 
presence of the Infinite, the Universal, the Absolute. It alone can 
make us free indeed, not by doing aAvay Avith the external laAv, but 
by enabling us in our own spontaneity to fulfil the law; Avhich is the 
object of all education, and should be of all human aspiration. 

But, as we have seen, the mind can not get out of itself, and yet, 
what has been giA'en in sensation you have throAvn from you and 
already put in the thing, or rather, haA^e made it the thing. How 



17 

are you to get it back into mind again, to enable tbe reason to re- 
cognize itself in it? It is absolutely necessary, as you see, to get in 
terms of the reasoning the limitations given first in sensation. The 
only possibility left now for science, is for the reason to go out and 
limit itself by the limitations of sense made olject. To illustrate : 
suppose you wish to get a cast containing the limitations or form 
of a given object; you first take an impression in plaster; you now 
make it the object of which you take an impression in a given 
metal ; you now have in metal the limitations of the original ob- 
ject. So you first take an impression of nature in the terms of ex- 
ternal sense, you now make this the object and take an impression 
of it in terms of the reason. You now have, not science, but the 
first condition of science; you have the object in terms of the rea- 
son, — but the science is the reason coming to know and recognize 
itself in this its own object. As the thing in itself exists in those 
same limitations which you now have in terms of the reason, the 
reason in knowing itself in its own object, knows the thing in itself. 
The object of reason thus obtained is always an idea limited by its 
opposite, — as we have already seen the "definitions" upon which 
geometry is based consist of the idea Space limited by its opposite. 
Now we see whence the definitions come, and understand clearly 
what they are. We now have some insight, I think, back to where 
science must begin, if it begin at all. The definitions upon which 
geometry is based, are, in distinction from the objects of sense, ob- 
jects of reason : they are ideal, not sensual. The words, point, line, 
triangle, &c., are but signs to represent to the miderstanding the lim- 
itations of the idea; consequently, when I say a triangle is a figure 
bounded by three straight lines, I give only a verbal definition of the 
Avord triangle; but the word defined is only a sign of the Conception. 
So when I draw a triangle on the blackboard, the diagram is only a 
sensual representation. The real, Avhich the verbal definition and 
diagram represent, is the ideal object — the object of reason. There 
are many who think they study mathematics, who never grasp the 
real definitions, but only the shadow as given in sensations. All these 
ever reach are forms and rules. When they get a little older and 
dabble in philosophy, they tell us mathematics is based upon hy- 
potheses and even absurdities ; for, say they, '•'■nothing can have 
position which has neither length, breadth, nor thickness, as the 
the mathematician predicates oi ^ point.'''' This only shows that 
the objector himself does not see the point, and it is to be feared 
he never will see it, because not given in sensation. 

The science of mathematics, in all its various branches, from the 
determining the product of two and two, to the highest achieve- 



18 

ments of Newton or LaPlace, is constituted of the expressions of 
the reason in the act of coming to know itself in the various limit- 
ations of the idea Qi(cmtity. This definition follows from wliat has 
already been sufficiently insisted upon, but I will try to make it 
even more clear. The data of every mathematical problem must 
limit the problem, or it can not be solved. This involves, if clearly 
understood, the most that I have said to-night. Every standard 
measure of real things must be given both in sensation and in rea- 
son; that is, it must be both cognized in sensation and recognized 
by the reason. For instance, Avhen I say a foot is one straight line 
twelve inches long, here the straight line and numbers one and 
twelve are recognized limitations of reason, whereas /bo^ and inch 
are cognized limitations of objects. All the standard measures are 
such as as are both cognized and recognized together, and hence 
used Avith the least iiossible effort. But all which is necessary is 
that the data should limit both the thing and the idea. Hence, on 
the side of sensation I may use inch, foot, yard, pole, or any stand- 
ard, provided I cognize it ; so on the side of reason I am not 
restricted to straight line, but may use triangle, square, circle, &c., 
&c., provided they can be both cognized and recognized. Hence 
you see the application of the whole of mathematics to jjhysical 
science in regard to its qiiantitativie determinations, Thoi;gh I 
can not measure the height of a steeple with a straight line, a foot 
stick, I can measure it with a triangle. Here the cognition and 
recognition are not together, and apparently in the same act of 
mind, as wdien a foot rule is used, since we can not recognize the 
triangle in all its properties by a simple act of the reason. Hence, 
when Ave get the base line, or one side of the triangle, in units of 
feet, and the angles in units of degrees — all of AAiiich are both cog- 
nized and recognized — Ave neglect for a time the side of sensation, 
that the reason may recognize itself in the triangle; and Avhen Ave 
thus recognize the other leg of the triangle in units — terms of the 
reason — Ave then put back these units into feet from which Ave took 
them, and noAV both cognize and recognize the height of the stee- 
ple at once ; that is, Ave knoAV it. This is an illustration of every 
application of mathematics to physical science. 

But the different sciences may involve different ideas ; quantity 
is not the only idea involved in the physical sciences. The ancient 
Greeks did not, for obvious reasons, succeed in developing a science 
of other ideas as they did of the idea quantity, and Avith us other 
ideas have but little to do Avith assumed knowledge, Avith sci- 
ence. We do not recognize the Platonic "Idea" as the A'ery 
life of all science, of all knoAvledge and all success; and it is 



19 

fashionable in these days to declare, both implicitly and expli- 
citly, that the Organon of Bacon has superseded the Organon of 
Aristotle. As both sensation and reason are essential to physical 
science — the one to give the condition, the other the essence and 
life — it is difficult to comprehend how the one can supersede the 
other, except upon the assumption that reason is nonessential to 
science. But if, as we have seen, science consists in the reason 
knowing and recognizing itself, then this judgment can be but a 
sign of ourselves, that sense has superseded reason in us ; — 

" Doth the harmony 
In the sweet lute-strings belong 
To the purchaser, who, dull of ear, doth keep 
The instrument? True, she hath bought the right 
To strike it into fragments, — ^yet no art 
To wake its silvery tones, and melt with bliss 
Of thrilling song ! Truth to the wise exists, 
And beauty for the feeling heart." 

I now find that many points are left untouched Avhicli I intend- 
ed to discuss, and which would be necessary to give unity to the 
subject; but I find time will not i^ermit, and I must hasten to a 
conclusion. Let me remark, however, that Axioms are but expres- 
sions in terms of the understanding of the living-force of the rea- 
son of each individual. How erroneous, therefore, is the definition 
that an axiom is that which all men receive as absolutely true. An 
axiom is an absolute and universal truth, but it may not be recog- 
nized by all men. If I had sufficient energy of thought or living 
force of self-conscious reason, the proposition that the square of the 
hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two 
sides of a right-angled triangle, would become an axiom ; but as I 
have not this, and as the mind can not transcend itself, I have to 
use the lever of method. But as all this is but the carrying out of 
what has already been said, I need not dwell upon it. This living 
energy of reason was so great in Plato, Shakspeare, and Goethe, 
that they could lift greater weights directly than most men could 
with all the appliances of levers and pullies. 

We have seen that, as the mind can not get out of itself, (and 
this j^osition is /»?plicitly admitted by all, though it may be ea'pli- 
citly denied,) it can know only through a knowledge of itself. We 
have seen that we can know physical nature even, only because 
nature exists in its limitations, and these limitations are identical 
with the limitations of mind or the laws of thought. And God being 
Infinite Mind, in whose image we are created, the mind knows God 
only in so far as it becomes self-conscious or knows itself " God 



20 

is a Spirit, and tliey wlio worship Ilim must Avorship Ilini in spi- 
rit and in truth." But we have seen, also, that the mind can know 
itself only in self-conscious reason, and that reason hence is the 
only criterion of truth. It is sad to reflect how little self-conscious 
reason there is in the Avorld, in humanity. Tliough reason is the 
only criterion of truth, and it alone can exalt us and free us, by en- 
ablin<^ us to unite and cooperate with the Universal and Absolute, 
yet, do Ave not see this our only hope condemned and ujibraided 
even in the pulpit, driven from the state, and trampled doAvn and 
spit upon by politics, and treated little better by science, so-called? 
When this is gone, what have we left? Nothing but individual 
tape-strings ! Oh, yes ! they all talk loudly about the " Higher 
Law," and say "do right! do right!" And you ask them, what is 
the Higher Law? what is right? — and they immediately and Avith 
the most impudent assurance present their individual tape-strings, 
and commence straightway measuring ! measuring! But by Avhat 
authority are these stamped ? By the senses, the feelings, the j^as- 
sions. But each individual has a diiferent standard stamped by 
the same authority, except where what is called education induces 
many to use the same string. And Avhat power is umpire in these 
irrei>ressible conflicts tlius inevitably induced ? God is out of the 
question, as reason has been dethroned, and nothing is left but 
physical force. Hence fomily, political and religious discord and 
strife — one tape-string in conflict Avith another ; no self-conscious 
reason, no knowledge of the Absolute. If you direct your mind 
through the Avhole range of human activities, you find labels ac- 
cording to these tape-strings stuck on every thing — the most sa- 
cred no less than secular. And this is called KnoAvledge ! Truth ! 
Higher Law ! And Education, in all its various departments, is, 
in the main, the drilling into the young these lifeless forms, these 
shams, these midnight apparitions, these labels arranged in order 
to suit the easy method of the sensational understanding. Oh! it 
is sad to behold hoAV grossly humanity is engulfed into the senses. 
"We boast that Ave are the lords of creation ; Avhich means, that Ave 
can bridle the horse, and that Ave Avill ultimately exterminate the 
lion : for, the spirit of liumanity is indicated, not in the question, 
hoAV shall Ave use those gifts to us Avhich have not been A'ouchsafed 
to beasts ? but rather, hoAV shall avc make up our deficit'in beastly 
gifts? — "What shall we eat? Avhat shall avc drink? and Avhere- 
Avithal shall we be clothed?" 



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